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0. Abstract 
 
The present study is the first international experimental examination of the assumption 
that both, taxpayers’ trust in authorities and the power of authorities increase tax 
payments by creating voluntary and enforced tax compliance. A questionnaire based 
experiment was conducted among 1350 students from Austria, Hungary, Romania and 
Russia, investigating the influence of trust and power on tax compliance and the 
intention to pay taxes. Results indicate in line with previous findings that intentions to 
pay taxes are highest in an environment with high power of authorities and high trust in 
authorities. High power of authorities leads to enforced tax compliance, whereas high 
trust in authorities induces voluntary tax compliance. Tax evasion was observed to be 
highest in cases of untrustworthy and powerless tax authorities. In sum, data confirms 
the assumptions of the slippery slope framework. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Taxes guarantee public finances. They do not only ensure national budgets, but also 
reflect the idea of social solidarity. However, since ancient times, taxes and their 
legitimacy have been content to discussions. These discussions prevail until today, but 
never in history has the struggle for tax compliance caught more attention. 
 
Since globalization has facilitated cross-national financial transactions, tax evasion and 
the fighting of tax havens are placed on top of political agendas throughout the world. 
Political approaches in eliminating tax deficits usually focus on closing loopholes in 
national tax laws and negotiating bilateral tax agreements. When it comes to tax 
compliance, this access may be called deficit orientated, since it does not increase tax 
revenues by improving compliance, but by making tax evasion more difficult. A lot of 
research has been conducted in order to identify determinants of tax compliance. Early 
studies suggest that economic factors like the probability of being detected and the 
severity of penalties play an important role in the determination of tax compliance 
(Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Becker, 1967). Literature reviews, however, report 
predominantly inconsistent findings on the relationship between audit probabilities, 
fines and tax compliance (Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, 1998; Fischer, Wartick, & 
Mark, 1992) and Alm (1991) notes, that if detection and punishment were the only 
factors influencing tax compliance, actually observed tax evasion rates would be way 
higher. More recent approaches, that investigate the relationship between monetary 
rewards and tax compliance, show inconsistent results (Bazard & Pickhard, 2011; 
Kastlunger, Muehlbacher, Kirchler & Mittone, 2011). Thus, the traditional point of 
view has been recharged and trust in the political leadership and tax morale have been 
suggested as additional determinants of tax compliance (e.g. Fjeldstad, 2004; Lago-
Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010; Lavoie, 2009; Torgler, 2005). 
 
In order to exemplify these different approaches in one applicatory model, Kirchler 
(2007) and Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008) developed the “slippery slope 
framework”, which points out two dimensions as essential for tax compliance: Trust in 
authorities and power of authorities. Accordingly, tax compliance can be enhanced by 
increasing either one or both of these factors. The quality of tax compliance, however, 
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depends on the character of its source: An increase in trust in authorities is supposed to 
lead to voluntary tax compliance, whereas an increase in power of authorities should 
cause enforced tax compliance.  
 
The manuscript at hand presents the first experimental study to investigate the slippery 
slope framework within an international sample of participants from Austria, Hungary, 
Romania and Russia. Since first empirical evidence (Muehlbacher, Kirchler & 
Schwarzenberger, 2011; Wahl, Kastlunger & Kirchler, 2010) supports the theoretical 
assumptions of the framework on an Austrian sample, this study focuses on the question 
whether the impact of trust and power as determinants of tax compliance might also be 
found in an international context. 
 
1.1. The Slippery Slope Framework 
 
Kirchler (2007) and Kirchler et al. (2008) present the slippery slope framework as a 
tool, which integrates factors considered important for explaining tax compliance. It 
consists of three dimensions: The power of tax authorities, the trust in tax authorities 
and tax compliance, which is determined by the interaction of power and trust. The 
authors assume that in conditions with low extents of trust in tax authorities and low 
power of authorities tax compliance will be at a minimum level, since under the 
prevailing circumstances citizens will seek to maximize their individual profit by 
evading taxes. Therefore a higher extent of tax compliance can be achieved in two 
different ways: By an increase of authorities’ power – which leads to enforced tax 
compliance – or by an increase of trust in tax authorities – which leads to voluntary tax 
compliance. Thus, tax compliance will be enhanced if both, the power of tax authorities 
and the trust in tax authorities increase. 
 
Besides integrating relevant predictors of tax compliance, the slippery slope framework 
aims at providing regulatory strategies for tax authorities in order to increase tax 
compliance. It suggests that tax authorities should actively create an atmosphere, in 
which tax payers are willing to pay taxes voluntarily. Therefore service oriented 
behavior of tax authorities and a synergistic climate should replace the often prevailing 
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antagonistic atmosphere between taxpayers and authorities, in which compliance is only 
achieved by force and the threat of punishments. 
 
In first empirical examinations of the slippery slope framework Wahl et al. (2010) and 
Muehlbacher et al. (2011) show that tax compliance can in fact be increased in two 
different ways. An increase in authorities’ power leads to enforced tax compliance, 
whereas an increase in taxpayers’ trust in tax authorities leads to voluntary tax 
compliance. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Slippery Slope Framework 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The slippery slope framework: Tax compliance as a function of trust and power. 
Adapted from “Enforced Versus Voluntary Tax Compliance: The “Slippery Slope” 
Framework,” by E. Kirchler, E. Hoelzl and I. Wahl, 2008, Journal of Economic Psychology, 29, 
p. 212. 
 
 
These findings are supported by Wahl, Endres, Kirchler and Böck (2011), who adopt 
the slippery slope framework to a related social dilemma situation. Their study 
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investigates the behavior of public transport passengers as a function of trust in and 
power of authorities. In line with previous findings their results suggest that in a trustful 
atmosphere, passengers buy tickets for public transport even though they assume not to 
be controlled (voluntary compliance), whereas a powerful perception of authorities 
leads to compliant behavior only in situations where detection and punishment of fare 
evasion is likely (enforced compliance). 
 
1.1.1. Trust in Authorities. 
 
Trust – in the context of tax compliance – is defined as the commonly shared opinion 
that tax authorities’ behavior and work serve the purpose of benefiting society (Kirchler, 
Hölzl & Wahl., 2008). This characterization of trust finds its origin in the works of 
Eberl (2003) and Tyler (2003), who point out the social function of trust. Therefore trust 
requires a certain level of quality in relations between interacting partners, which leads 
to the reciprocal ascription of positive characteristics and an internal motivation to 
maintain this positive relationship. 
 
The relationship between trust and tax compliance has been analyzed in numerous 
publications. Several results of international research indicate that trust in the 
government and its authorities has a positive impact on tax compliance (e.g. Bergman, 
2002; Fjeldstad, 2004; Hammar, Jagers & Nordblom, 2009; Richardson, 2008). Torgler 
(2003) analyses international data and concludes that trust in the legal system and its 
representatives has a positive influence on tax morale. In addition, Murphy’s (2004) 
findings in Australia suggest that trust plays an important role in enhancing tax 
compliance, since high trust causes low resistance to tax authorities. Feld and Frey 
(2007) point out, that the subjective feeling of fair and legitimate political processes and 
friendly, respectful interaction with tax authorities is positively influencing tax 
compliance by creating a “psychological contract”. 
 
With regard to the slippery slope framework, Wahl et al. (2010) and Muehlbacher et al. 
(2011) describe the relationship between trust and tax compliance in greater detail, 
demonstrating that trust in tax authorities is the strongest predictor for voluntary tax 
compliance, whereas enforced tax compliance is negatively related to trust. According 
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to Kirchler et al. (2008), another practical implication of a trustful relationship between 
taxpayers and tax authorities is particularly relevant: Mutual trust and respectful 
cooperation creates a synergistic tax climate. A synergistic tax climate is characterized 
by low social distances and respectful interaction processes between taxpayers and tax 
authorities. With regard to governmental institutions, this leads to service-oriented 
attitudes and transparent procedures. Taxpayers on the other hand behave intrinsically 
compliant in such a climate, since they feel obliged to make a contribution to social 
welfare. 
 
1.1.2. Power of Authorities. 
 
The power component of the slippery slope framework integrates various approaches 
prevailing in literature that explain tax evasion by rational means, such as detection 
probabilities and the severity of penalties for tax crimes. Accordingly, Kirchler et al. 
(2008) define tax authorities’ power as taxpayers’ perception of the governments’ 
ability to discover tax crimes for instance by conducting audits and to punish tax 
evasion by fines or jail sentences. The relevance of subjectivity in this context has been 
pointed out by Fischer et al. (1992). Their broad literature review suggests that tax 
compliance is highly influenced by perceived detection probability, so that the effect of 
tax authorities’ power on tax compliance is moderated by subjective perceptions and 
evaluations of governmental capacities to discover and punish tax evasion. Thus, 
perceived power of tax authorities depends on two factors: Tax legislation, respectively 
the budget to enforce it on the one hand, and taxpayers’ knowledge and attitudes 
regarding the fiscal system on the other hand. 
 
With regard to the relationship between power of authorities and tax compliance, 
Kirchler (2007) lists several empirical findings on the influence of audit probabilities, 
fines, income and tax rates. Results, however, are inconclusive, since publications show 
evidence for and against an effect of those factors on tax compliance (Andreoni et al., 
1998; Fischer et al., 1992). According to Kirchler et al. (2008), perceived power of tax 
authorities leads to enforced tax compliance in an environment with little mutual trust. 
However, the function of authorities’ power on tax compliance is assumed to underlie 
ceiling effects. The exceedance of a certain level of perceived and executed power leads 
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to distrust between authorities and taxpayers, so that an antagonistic tax climate results. 
An antagonistic tax climate though is characterized by large social distances and mutual 
distrust, so that authorities expect taxpayers to evade whenever possible, whereas 
taxpayers feel prosecuted and react with retreat.  
 
1.1.3. Dynamic Effects of Trust and Power. 
 
In order to consider the heterogeneity of different findings, the slippery slope 
framework accounts not only for power and trust related aspects of tax compliance, but 
also for dynamic effects of power on trust and vice versa (Kirchler et al., 2008). 
 
Several findings illuminate the interdependent relationship between power and trust 
(Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et al., 2008; Muehlbacher et al., 2011; Wahl et al., 2010). 
Turner (2005) specifies two forms of power. Accordingly, legitimate power is based on 
a positive perception of governmental institutions, which leads to a positive attitude 
towards authorities, the acceptance of the legitimacy of rules and voluntary compliance. 
A negative perception of governmental institutions and their capacity to detect and 
punish non-compliance, however, leads to coercive power. In terms of the slippery 
slope framework, legitimate power is located in high trust regions, whereas coercive 
power is located in low trust areas. Lavoie (2009) reports that the right of co-
determination of tax legislation increases authorities’ legitimate power, which in turn 
enhances trust in authorities and, thus, has a positive influence on tax compliance. 
Findings from Switzerland (Feld & Frey, 2007) support this thesis, showing that the 
perception of fair and legitimate political processes lead to honest taxpaying behavior. 
Furthermore, procedural fairness is closely linked to legitimacy of authorities’ actions 
(Tyler, 1990). Torgler (2005) demonstrates that direct democracy has a positive 
influence on tax morale.  
 
The dynamic interaction effects of trust and power may be illustrated by an example: If 
political actions induce higher fines for tax evasion, perceived power of authorities is 
likely to increase. However, with regard to taxpayers trust in authorities, such a means 
could cause two possible reactions of honest taxpayers. On the one hand, they could 
perceive the increase in power as an attempt to enhance the quality of pursuing 
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dishonest tax payers, which would lead to an increase in trust in the authorities and, 
thus, to a higher level of tax compliance due to the synergistic climate. On the other 
hand, taxpayers might interpret this increase in authorities’ power as a sign of distrust, 
which then would lead to a decrease in trust in tax authorities due to the reciprocity of 
mutual trust. As a consequence tax compliance may decline as well, and an antagonistic 
climate could emerge. The perceived form of authorities’ power, however, would be 
legitimate in the first and coercive in the latter case. 
 
The perception of changes in power is influenced by the prevailing tax climate (Wahl et 
al., 2010). While an increase in power is perceived as legitimate in a synergistic climate, 
it is experienced as coercive in an antagonistic environment. Falk and Kosfeld (2004) 
found that controls induce a feeling of being distrusted and reduce trust and 
cooperation. Vice versa, governments with poor legitimate power are hardly trusted by 
their citizens, since their lack of ability to enforce dishonest taxpayers undermines 
mutual trust and a synergistic climate in general. Consequently, honest taxpayers might 
start to distrust authorities. In line with these findings, Lavoie (2008) points out that the 
way of exerting power in an appropriate fashion is essential not only in order to be 
judged as acting fairly, but also to serve the community by forcing tax evaders to 
cooperate. An international study of Richardson (2008) revealed, that low tax evasion is 
connected to trust and legal enforcement strategies. 
 
1.1.4. Enforced versus Voluntary Compliance. 
 
As already pointed out, the slippery slope framework suggests that tax compliance is 
high in cases of trustworthy and powerful authorities. However, depending on the 
quality of the perceived atmosphere between taxpayers and tax authorities, the character 
of compliance may differ. High trust in authorities is likely to cause the perception of a 
synergistic climate, which will presumably induce taxpayers to feel morally bound to 
contribute to the common good by paying taxes honestly. Hence, the resulting tax 
compliance will be voluntary (Wahl et al., 2010). On the other hand, high power of 
authorities in a distrustful atmosphere is likely to cause the perception of an antagonistic 
climate. In such circumstances taxpayers might weight up potential gains against costs 
of tax evasions and consequently – due to the high power of authorities to pursue tax 
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crimes – pay taxes as a result of authorities’ enforcement (Wahl et al., 2010). Another 
effect of an antagonistic climate might be reactance of taxpayers due to the feeling of 
constraint by tax authorities. This reactance in turn could cause active tax evasion, 
which is characterized by the attempt to exploit loopholes in the surveillance system in 
order to minimize tax payments. According to Wahl et al. (2010), tax evasion is 
particularly likely in an antagonistic climate with little power of tax authorities in order 
to detect tax crimes.  
 
Voluntary and enforced tax compliance differ with regard to the motivation to comply. 
In order to operationalize the two forms of compliance, Braithwaite’s (2003) 
motivational concepts of “commitment” and “resistance” are suggested by Wahl et al. 
(2010). Thus, the moral feeling of obligation to contribute taxes honestly, which 
corresponds to voluntary tax compliance, is approached by a measurement of 
commitment. Accordingly, commitment is expected to be higher in high trust 
conditions, especially when power is perceived as legitimate. On the other hand, low 
trust and high power settings, which lead to enforced tax compliance, are addressed by 
the concept of resistance. Resistant taxpayers show little tax compliance since they 
distrust tax authorities. French and Raven (1959) state that coercive power should lead 
to resistance. This suggests that the perception of coercive power in an untrustworthy 
environment causes resistant behavior (Wahl et al, 2010). 
 
1.2. Tax Morale, Corruption and Shadow Economy 
 
The willingness to pay taxes honestly is not only determined by the factors mentioned 
above. Beyond that, tax compliance has social and moral components, which interact 
reciprocally and influence each other. In order to address the nature of tax compliance 
in a holistic way, the incidence of corruption and the extent of the national shadow 
economy have to be considered, since they are not only related to the amount of trust in 
the state, but also give insight into the prevailing power of national institutions. 
 
Alm and Torgler (2006) define tax morale as individual moral principles and values 
with regard to taxpaying. Literature shows, that societal variables, such as perceived tax 
evasion and national pride, influence tax morale (Torgler & Schneider, 2005). Tax 
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morale varies among different countries (Alm & Torgler, 2006) and is said to influence 
tax compliance (Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee & Torgler, 2009). 
 
Since peer behavior influences the disposition to corruption (e.g. Dong, Dulleck & 
Torgler, 2012), an international comparison of tax compliance also has to take the 
amount of national corruption into account. With regard to the countries participating in 
this study, literature reveals large differences in corruption. In the 2011 Corruption 
Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2011), corruption is defined as the abuse 
of entrusted power for private profits. It rates Austria as one of the countries with the 
least level of corruption worldwide. Hungary and Romania on the other hand are rated 
as countries with medium up to rather high corruption, whereas Russia is rated as one of 
the most corrupt countries in the world. 
 
Besides corruption, the size of a countries’ shadow economy plays an important role in 
tax moral research. The findings of Torgler and Schneider (2007; 2009) indicate that the 
extent of a countries shadow economy is significantly influenced by its inhabitants’ tax 
morale. Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro (2010) estimate the size of shadow 
economies in relation to a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and define shadow 
economy as the amount of legally produced goods and services that are intentionally 
concealed from public authorities in order to avoid the paying of any form of taxes. 
Their findings suggest that in the period between 1999 and 2007, Austria was one of the 
countries with the lowest extent of shadow economy worldwide, whereas Hungary, 
Romania and especially Russia showed a large shadow economy in comparison to the 
GDP. 
 
The integration of the abovementioned findings in the theoretical concept of the slippery 
slope framework indicates that in highly corrupt countries with large shadow economies 
enforced and voluntary tax compliance are low. This would suggest, that high degrees 
of tax evasion prevail particularly in countries with untrustworthy and little powerful 
tax authorities. On the other hand, in countries with little corruption and small shadow 
economies, high tax compliance could be caused by both, enforced or voluntary tax 
compliance. 
 
18 
 
1.3. Gender and Age Effects  
 
Effects of gender and age on tax compliance have been extensively examined (e.g. 
Jackson and Milliron, 1986). Several studies report a higher tax compliance of older 
taxpayers (e.g. Braithwaite, Smart & Reinhart, 2006; Feinstein, 1991; Tittle, 1980). 
With regard to gender, literature shows higher tax compliance rates of female taxpayers 
(e.g. Brooks & Doob, 1990; Collins, Milliron & Toy, 1992). In order to take account for 
these findings, the present study controlled for gender and age effects by introducing 
them as covariates in the statistical analyses. 
 
2. Method 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
A total of 1350 students from Austria (N = 329), Hungary (N = 280), Romania (N 
= 400) and Russia (N = 341) participated in the study, 94.8 percent of them studied 
business. The sample consisted of 61 percent female and 39 percent male participants 
and overall the participants age ranged from 16 to 41 years (M = 20.92, SD = 2.62). The 
age of participants from Austria, Hungary and Romania ranged from a mean of 21.11 
years (SD = 2.13) in Hungary to a mean of 21.95 years (SD = 3.42) in Austria. Due to 
the shorter duration of secondary education, the mean age in Russia (M = 18.82, SD 
= 1.92) was lower than in the other countries. 52.4 percent of the participants reported 
an income of less than € 500 per month and 38.7 percent reported an income between 
€ 501 and € 1.000, so that almost 85 percent of the participants stated to gain an income 
of less than € 1,000 per month. 8.4 percent indicated an income between € 1,001 and 
€ 1,500 per month and 3.0 percent an income between € 1,501 and € 2,000. 4.4 percent 
of the participants reported an income of more than € 2,000 per month. 
 
2.2. Experimental and Material Procedures 
 
The questionnaire based experiment was conducted with students from several 
universities. The Austrian sample consisted of students from the two major universities 
in Vienna: The University of Vienna (Faculty of Business, Economics and Statistics) 
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and the Vienna University of Economics and Business. Participation in the experiment 
was voluntary and no financial incentives were provided. 
 
The experiment started with an introduction about the fictitious state Varosia (Appendix 
A), which has previously been used by Wahl et al. (2010). The introduction was slightly 
adapted in order to achieve international comparability and to enhance the experimental 
manipulation. It existed in four different forms, according to the manipulation of the 
two factors trust (low vs. high) and power (low vs. high), so that four experimental 
conditions resulted: In the low trust condition, Varosia is described as a country with 
little political stability, little legal transparency and very untrustworthy authorities. In 
the high trust condition, the political situation of Varosia is described as very stable with 
a highly transparent legislation and very trustworthy authorities. The introduction text 
of the low power condition describes tax authorities in Varosia as highly ineffective 
with regard to prosecution and punishment of tax evasion. However, in the high power 
condition, tax authorities in Varosia are described as very efficient, pursuing and 
punishing tax evasion in a very severe manner. 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions and asked to imagine 
living, working and paying taxes in Varosia. After the instructions, a Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1 (very low) to 9 (very high) was presented (Appendix B), which 
consisted of eight different scales that have already been used in other experiments in 
the field of tax psychology. The manipulation checks to measure the perceived levels of 
trust and power and the scale “intended tax compliance”, as well as the scale “perceived 
similarity between Varosia and the home country” have been used in the questionnaire 
of Wahl et al. (2010). Those four scales consisted of three items each. The manipulation 
checks for trust (e.g. “The governmental authorities in Varosia act fair towards their 
citizens”, 1 = “Complete disagreement” to 9 = “Complete agreement”) and for power 
(e.g. “Chances that tax evasion will be detected in Varosia are high”, 1 = “Complete 
disagreement” to 9 = “Complete agreement”) were highly reliable (Cronbach’s α = .85 
for both scales). The scales intended tax compliance (e.g. “How likely would you pay 
your tax completely honest?”, 1 = “Very unlikely“ to 9 = “Very likely“) and perceived 
similarity between Varosia and the home country (e.g. “How similar do you perceive 
the country of Varosia in comparison to your own country?”, 1 = “Very unsimilar” to 9 
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= “Very similar”) were highly reliable as well with α = .80 (intended tax compliance), 
respectively α = .90 (perceived similarity). Three other scales with five items each were 
published in the tax compliance inventory (TAX-I) by Kirchler and Wahl (2010). The 
items measuring enforced tax compliance (e.g. “When I pay my taxes in Varosia as 
required by the regulations, I do so, because a great many tax audits are carried out“, 1 
= „Complete disagreement“ to 9 = „Complete agreement“) and voluntary tax 
compliance (e.g. “When I pay my taxes in Varosia as required by the regulations, I do 
so, because for me it’s the natural thing to do“, 1 = “Complete disagreement“ to 9 = 
“Complete agreement“) were published by Braithwaite, 2003. Both scales were highly 
reliable with Cronbach’s α = .88 (enforced tax compliance), respectively α = .85 
(voluntary tax compliance). The scale tax evasion consisted of realistic scenarios, which 
offered participants a possibility for tax evasion. Participants were asked to rate the 
likelihood of evading taxes being in such a situation on a scale from 1 = “Very 
unlikely” to 9 = “Very likely”. Items were highly reliable with α = .85. Finally one item 
was used in order to address tax morale in general (“Generally speaking, is cheating on 
tax never justified, always justified or something in between?“, 1 = “Never justified“ to 
9 = „Always justified“). As published by Alm and Torgler (2006).  
 
In addition, demographic data (age, sex, income) was collected. In all countries methods 
and procedures were exactly alike. Merely those descriptions of the fictitious state 
Varosia that referred to size and number of inhabitants were adapted to each country’s 
characteristics in order to make it easier for participants to imagine Varosia. 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Perceived Similarity 
 
In order to examine which condition was experienced as most similar to the 
participants’ home country, a two-way MANCOVA was calculated with the 
independent factors condition and country, covariates gender and age, and perceived 
similarity as dependent variable. Results reveal a significant condition effect 
(F(3, 1311) = 144.02, p < .001, η² = .25). Overall low trust conditions were reported to 
have a higher similarity (trust low and power high condition: Estimated mean = 6.06, 
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SE = 0.11, trust low and power low condition: Estimated mean = 6.05, SE = 0.11) to 
participants’ home countries than high trust conditions (trust high and power high 
condition: Estimated mean = 3.41, SE = 0.11, trust high and power low condition: 
Estimated mean = 5.15, SE = 0.11). Participants’ home country did also have a 
significant effect on perceived similarity (F(3, 1311) = 25.93, p < .001, η² = .06). 
Overall Austrian participants rated Varosia as least similar (estimated mean = 4.04, SE 
= 0.12) compared to participants from Romania (estimated mean = 5.09, SE = 0.10), 
Hungary (estimated mean = 5.12, SE = 0.12) or Russia (estimated mean = 5.42, SE 
= 0.12). The interaction effect between condition and country is significant 
(F(3, 1311) = 52.70, p < .001, η² = .08), since participants from Austria (estimated 
mean = 4.37, SE = 0.21) and Romania (estimated mean = 6.44, SE = 0.20) report 
highest similarity in the low trust and high power scenario, whereas Russian (estimated 
mean = 7.17, SE = 0.21) and Hungarian (estimated mean = 6.47, SE = 0.24) participants 
rate the low trust and low power setting as most similar. The main effect of age was not 
significant (F(1, 1311) = 0.52, p = .47). However, gender significantly influenced 
similarity ratings (F(1, 1311) = 7.40, p < .01, η² = .01). Women reported higher 
perceived similarity than men. 
 
In order to address the issue of similarity ratings in a simplified way, similarity ratings 
were clustered in three groups: Dissimilar rating of Varosia compared to participants’ 
home country (average ratings on the similarity scale: 1 to 3.49), neutral rating of 
Varosia compared to participants’ home country (average ratings: 3.5 to 6.49) and 
similar rating of Varosia compared to participants’ home country (average ratings: 6.5 
to 9). Table 1 shows frequencies of clustered similarity ratings for all countries. Overall, 
frequencies of similarity ratings were not equally distributed among the four countries 
(χ² (30, N = 1346) = 453.03, p < .001). In Hungary (χ² (6, N = 280) = 91.52, p < .001), 
Romania (χ² (6, N = 400) = 105.88, p < .001) and Russia (χ² (6, N = 338) = 158.80, 
p < .001), low trust descriptions of Varosia, in which its authorities and political system 
are described as very untrustworthy, were considered to be similar to the particular 
home country by most participants. The high trust conditions on the other hand, in 
which Variosa’s authorities and its political system are presented as highly trustworthy, 
were rated least similar by the participants. The Austrian sample (χ² (6, N = 328) = 4.77, 
p = 0.57) rated the high trust conditions as well as the low trust high power condition 
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neither similar, nor dissimilar to Austria. However, the low trust and low power 
condition was rated dissimilar to Austria by most of the participants. In none of the 
conditions, participants rated Varosia similar to Austria. 
 
Table 1 
Frequencies of Clustered Similarity Ratings of Variosa as a Function of Trust and Power 
 Low Trust  High Trust 
 
Low  
Power 
High  
Power 
 
Low  
Power 
High  
Power 
Dependent Variable (n = 326) (n = 334)  (n = 331) (n = 355) 
Austria      
Similar 12 12  6 8 
Neutral 35 43  41 39 
Dissimilar 36 28  35 33 
Hungary      
Similar 33 34  15 5 
Neutral 30 32  30 17 
Dissimilar 7 4  35 48 
Romania      
Similar 50 53  22 9 
Neutral 42 28  33 34 
Dissimilar 8 9  45 47 
Russia      
Similar 72 53  11 10 
Neutral 29 23  34 18 
Dissimilar 1 2  37 48 
 
 
3.2. Manipulation Check 
 
The items to check the experimental manipulations of trust in and power of Varosia’s 
authorities were presented in the first part of the questionnaire. A two-way MANOVA 
was calculated, with the independent factors trust, power and country. The answers 
referring to the trust and power manipulation check items were treated as dependent 
variables. Means and standard deviations of the manipulation check scales are shown in 
Table 2. Multivariate results show significant main effects for trust, 
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F(2, 1331) = 601.92, p < .001, η² = .48, and power, F(2, 1331) = 773.43, p < .001, η² 
= .54, and a significant interaction effect of trust and power, F(2, 1331) = 13.79, 
p < .001, η² = .02. The main effect for country is not significant, F(6, 2664) = 2.07, 
p = .05 η² = .01. Univariate results show that participants in the high trust conditions 
rated trust in Varosia’s authorities higher than participants in the low trust conditions 
(F(1, 1332) = 1178.73, p < .001, η² = .47; low trust: Estimated mean = 2.71, SE = 0.07; 
high trust: Estimated mean = 5.91, SE = 0.07). In addition, the power manipulation 
influences the reported trust in authorities (F(1, 1332) = 72.50, p < .001, η² = .05; low 
power: Estimated mean = 3.91, SE = 0.07; high power: Estimated mean = 4.71, SE 
= 0.07). The results of the power manipulation show that participants in the high power 
conditions rated power of Varosia’s authorities higher than participants in the low 
power conditions (F(1, 1332) = 1541.57, p < .001, η² = .54; low power: Estimated mean 
= 2.91, SE = 0.07; high power: Estimated mean = 6.64, SE = 0.07). 
 
 
Table 2 
Means and Standard Errors of Manipulation Check Scales as a Function of Trust and Power 
 Low Trust  High Trust 
Dependent Variable 
Low  
Power 
High  
Power 
 Low  
Power 
High  
Power 
Check Trust 2.54 (0.09)a 2.88 (0.09)b  5.29 (0.09)c 6.53 (0.10)d 
Check Power 2.85 (0.09)a 6.26 (0.10)b  2.98 (0.10)a 7.02 (0.10)c 
Note: Higher scores indicate higher ascribed trust, respectively power. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses. Means with differing letters in the same row differ at p < .05. 
 
 
Furthermore, the trust manipulation influences the reported power auf authorities 
(F(1, 1332) = 21.91, p < .001, η² = .02; low trust: Estimated mean = 4.55, SE = 0.07; 
high trust: Estimated mean = 5.00, SE = 0.07). The variable country did neither have an 
effect on trust ratings (F(3, 1332) = 1.86, p = .13), nor on power ratings (F(3, 1332) 
= 1.24, p = .29). Accordingly, the manipulation of trust and power has been successful. 
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3.3. Intended Tax Compliance 
 
Table 3 shows the estimated means and standard errors of intended tax compliance. In 
order to examine trust, power and country effects on intended tax compliance, a three-
way MANCOVA was calculated with the independent factors trust, power and country, 
covariates gender and age, and dependent variables intended tax compliance, voluntary 
tax compliance, enforced tax compliance and tax evasion. Outcomes are presented in 
the next paragraphs. With regard to intended tax compliance, multivariate results show 
no interaction effects between trust and power (F(1, 1309) = 1.01, p = .31), respectively 
trust and country (F(3, 1309) = 1.29, p = .28), but a significant interaction of power and 
country (F(3, 1309) = 4.63, p < .01, η² = .01). 
 
 
Table 3 
Estimated Means and Standard Errors of Intended Tax Compliance, Voluntary Tax Compliance, 
Enforced Tax Compliance and Tax Evasion as a Function of Trust and Power when Controlling 
for Age and Gender 
 Low Trust  High Trust 
Dependent Variable 
Low  
Power 
High  
Power 
 Low  
Power 
High  
Power 
Intended tax 
compliance 4.98 (0.10)
a
 6.32 (0.11)b  6.02 (0.11)c 7.15 (0.11)d 
Voluntary tax 
compliance 5.88 (0.10)
a
 5.46 (0.10)a  6.32 (0.10)b 6.47 (0.10)b 
Enforced tax 
compliance 4.38 (0.11)
a
 6.44 (0.11)b  4.00 (0.11)a 6.30 (0.11)b 
Tax evasion 6.05 (0.11)a 5.51 (0.11)a  5.15 (0.11)b 5.05 (0.11)b 
Note: Higher scores indicate higher acceptance of items. Means are corrected for covariates age = 20.95 
and gender = 0.61. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Means with differing letters in the same row 
differ at p < .05. 
 
 
This interaction effect is due to the Romanian subsample. In all other countries intended 
tax compliance is highest in scenarios with high power of authorities compared to 
scenarios with low power of authorities. However, in Romania the intention to behave 
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tax compliant in a powerless and trustful (estimated mean = 6.29; SE = 0.20) 
environment is higher than in a highly powerful but distrustful scenario (estimated 
mean = 5.85; SE = 0.20). Results show that participants in the high trust conditions 
report higher intended tax compliance than participants in the low trust conditions 
(significant main effect of trust, F(1, 1309) = 75.34, p < .001, η² = .05) and participants 
in the high power conditions report higher intended tax compliance than participants in 
the low power conditions (significant main effect of power, F(1, 1309) = 133.21, 
p <.001, η² = .09). Highest intended tax compliance was observed in the high trust and 
high power scenario (estimated mean = 7.15; SE = 0.11), compared to the high trust and 
low power scenario (estimated mean = 6.02; SE = 0.11), and the low trust and high 
power scenario (estimated mean = 6.32; SE = 0.11). Lowest tax compliance was 
observed in the low trust and low power scenario (estimated mean = 4.97; SE = 0.10). A 
significant main effect for country is found as well F(3, 1309) = 2.74, p =<.05, η² = 
.02). In an international comparison, participants from Hungary reported highest 
intended tax compliance (estimated mean = 6.40; SE = 0.12), whereas the Romanian 
(estimated mean = 6.05; SE = 0.10), Austrian (estimated mean = 6.01; SE = 0.11) and 
Russian (estimated mean = 6.01; SE = 0.12) sample reported lower levels of intended 
tax compliance. The covariate age does not have a significant influence on intended tax 
compliance (F(1, 1309) = 1.47, p = .27), whereas gender of participants influences the 
intention to pay taxes significantly (F(1, 1309) = 11.55, p = .001, η² = .01), with women 
reporting a higher intention to pay taxes. 
 
3.4. Voluntary versus Enforced Tax Compliance 
 
The estimated means and standard errors of voluntary tax compliance (i.e. commitment) 
and enforced tax compliance (i.e. resistance) are depicted in Table 3. With regard to 
voluntary tax compliance, results show significant interaction effects between trust and 
power (F(1, 1309) = 8.40, p < .01, η² = .01), indicating that voluntary tax compliance is 
highest in the high trust conditions. In the condition with low trust and low power, 
however, voluntary tax compliance is higher than in the low trust and high power 
condition. If Varosia’s authorities are described as trustworthy and powerful (estimated 
mean = 6.47; SE = 0.10), or trustworthy and powerless (estimated mean = 6.32; SE 
= 0.10), voluntary tax compliance was higher than in the low trust conditions 
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(untrustworthy and powerful: Estimated mean = 5.46; SE = 0.10, and untrustworthy and 
powerless: Estimated mean = 5.88; SE = 0.10). The significant interaction of trust and 
country (F(3, 1309) = 7.53, p < .001, η² = .02) reveals that participants from Hungary 
(high trust: Estimated mean = 6.72; SE = 0.15, low trust: Estimated mean = 5.66; SE 
= 0.15), Romania (high trust: Estimated mean = 6.63; SE = 0.12, low trust: Estimated 
mean = 5.91; SE = 0.13) and Russia (high trust: Estimated mean = 6.11; SE = 0.15, low 
trust: Estimated mean = 4.96; SE = 0.14) show higher voluntary tax compliance in high 
trust conditions. Participants from Austria, however, report higher voluntary tax 
compliance in low trust conditions (high trust: Estimated mean = 6.11; SE = 0.14, low 
trust: Estimated mean = 6.15; SE = 0.14). The interaction of power and country is not 
significant (F(3, 1309) = 1.71, p = .16). Furthermore, results show a significant main 
effect of trust (F(1, 1309) = 55.24, p < .001, η² = .04): Voluntary tax compliance ratings 
were higher in high trust scenarios (estimated mean = 6.40; SE = 0.07) compared to low 
trust scenarios (estimated mean = 5.67; SE = 0.07). The main effect of country is 
significant as well (F(3, 1309) = 9.73, p < .001, η² = .02). Thus, the highest level of 
voluntary tax compliance was observed in Romania (estimated mean = 6.27; SE = 0.09), 
compared to Hungary (estimated mean = 6.19; SE = 0.11), Austria (estimated mean 
= 6.13; SE = 0.10) and Russia (estimated mean = 5.53; SE = 0.11). However, no main 
effect of power could be observed (F(1, 1309) = 1.97, p = .16). Age does not have a 
significant influence on voluntary tax compliance (F(1, 1309) = 0.90, p = .34), whereas 
gender of participants influences the intention to pay taxes voluntarily significantly 
(F(1, 1309) = 8.00, p < .01, η² = .01). Women showed higher voluntary tax compliance. 
 
With regard to enforced tax compliance, results show no significant interaction effects 
between trust and power (F(1, 1309) = 1.27, p = .26), respectively trust and country 
(F(3, 1309) = 1.08, p = .36). The interaction of power and country, however, is 
significant (F(3, 1309) = 14.17, p < .001, η² = .03), since Austrian participants show a 
tendency to high enforced tax compliance in low power conditions compared to the 
other countries. Results suggest that in all countries enforced tax compliance is highest 
in the high power conditions compared to low power conditions: Hungary (high power: 
Estimated mean = 6.70; SE = 0.17, low power: Estimated mean = 3.66; SE = 0.17), 
Russia (high power: Estimated mean = 6.35; SE = 0.17, low power: Estimated mean 
= 3.85; SE = 0.16), Romania (high power: Estimated mean = 6.30; SE = 0.14, low 
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power: Estimated mean = 4.15; SE = 0.14), Austria (high power: Estimated mean 
= 6.14; SE = 0.16, low power: Estimated mean = 5.09; SE = 0.16). Results show 
significant main effects of trust (F(1, 1309) = 5.71, p < .05, η² = .004) and power 
(F(1, 1309) = 403.34, p < .001, η² = .24). Accordingly, higher enforced tax compliance 
was reported in low trust conditions (estimated mean = 5.41; SE = 0.08) compared to 
high trust conditions (estimated mean = 5.15; SE = 0.08) and in high power conditions 
(estimated mean = 6.37; SE = 0.08) compared to low power conditions (estimated mean 
= 4.12; SE = 0.08). Furthermore, the main effect of country was significant (F(3, 1309) 
= 4.00, p < .01, η² = .01), indicating that enforced tax compliance is highest in Austria 
(estimated mean = 5.61; SE = 0.11), compared to Romania (estimated mean = 5.22; 
SE = 0.10), Hungary (estimated mean = 5.17; SE = 0.12) and Russia (estimated mean 
= 5.10; SE = 0.12). Age does not have a significant influence on enforced tax 
compliance (F(1, 1309) = 0.14, p = .71), whereas gender of participants influences 
enforced tax compliance significantly (F(1, 1309) = 11.50, p < .001, η² = .01). Women 
reported higher enforced tax compliance. 
 
3.5. Tax Evasion 
 
The interaction between trust and power (F(1, 1309) = 3.98, p < .05, η² = .003) was 
significant, indicating that even though trust and power factors have an impact on tax 
evasion rates, the effect of trust dominates. Accordingly, tax evasion scores are highest 
if Varosia’s authorities are described as untrustworthy and powerless (estimated mean 
= 6.05; SE = 0.11), compared to untrustworthy and powerful authorities (estimated 
mean = 5.51; SE = 0.11), or trustworthy and powerless authorities (estimated mean 
= 5.15; SE = 0.11). The lowest level of tax evasion was observed in the high power and 
high trust condition (estimated mean = 5.05; SE = 0.11). Neither the interaction of trust 
and country (F(3, 1309) = 0.72, p = .54), nor the interaction of power and country is 
significant (F(3, 1309) = 0.42, p = .74). Furthermore, results show a significant main 
effect of trust (F(1, 1309) = 38.31, p < .001, η² = .03): Tax evasion ratings were higher 
in low trust scenarios (estimated mean = 5.78; SE = 0.08) compared to high trust 
scenarios (estimated mean = 5.10; SE = 0.08). Likewise, the main effect of power is 
significant (F(1, 1309) = 8.43, p < .01, η² = .01), indicating that tax evasion is higher in 
low power conditions (estimated mean = 5.60; SE = 0.08) compared to high power 
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conditions (estimated mean = 5.28; SE = 0.08). The main effect of country is significant 
as well (F(3, 1309) = 13.26, p < .001, η² = .03). Thus, the lowest tax evasion rating was 
observed in Romania (estimated mean = 4.87; SE = 0.10) compared to Hungary 
(estimated mean = 5.65; SE = 0.12), Austria (estimated mean = 5.63; SE = 0.11) and 
Russia (estimated mean = 5.62; SE = 0.12). Age does not have a significant influence on 
voluntary tax compliance (F(1, 1309) = 1.60, p = .21), whereas gender of participants 
influences the intention to pay taxes voluntarily significantly (F(1, 1309) = 19.89, p 
< .001, η² = .02). Men reported a higher intention to evade taxes. Estimated means and 
standard errors of tax evasion are shown in Table 3. 
 
3.6. Tax Morale 
 
To address general tax morale, a three-way ANCOVA was calculated with the 
independent factors trust, power and country, covariates gender and age, and tax morale 
as dependent variable (high values on the tax morale scale indicate little tax morale). No 
interaction effects between trust and power (F(1, 1307) = 1.25, p = .27), trust and 
country (F(3, 1307) = 0.26, p = .85) or power and country (F(3, 1307) = 1.00, p = .39) 
were found. In addition, no main effects of trust (F(1, 1307) = 3.69, p = .06) and power 
(F(1, 1307) = 0.01, p = .91) could be observed. Results show a significant effect of 
country (F(3, 1307) = 27.22, p < .001, η² = .06), indicating that tax morale in Romania 
(estimated mean = 4.80; SE = 0.10) and Russia (estimated mean = 4.75; SE = 0.12) is 
significantly lower than in Hungary (estimated mean = 3.94; SE = 0.12) and Austria 
(estimated mean = 3.69; SE = 0.11). No significant influence of age on tax morale could 
be found ((F(1, 1307) = 0.02, p = .89). However, the covariate gender did influence tax 
morale significantly (F(3, 1307) = 4.63, p < .05, η² = .004). Women showed higher tax 
morale than men.  
 
4. Discussion 
 
This study aimed at examining the slippery slope framework in an international context 
by empirically testing its main hypotheses in a questionnaire based experiment. In 
contrast to previous publications, which empirically address the validity of the slippery 
slope framework (Wahl et al., 2010; Muehlbacher et al., 2011), the present study is the 
first to integrate experimental data collected in Europe and Russia in order to illuminate 
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the cross-national influence of trust and power on tax evasion. Results support the 
assumption that trust in authorities and power of authorities increase tax compliance. 
Accordingly, governments can enhance the extent of tax payments by increasing 
taxpayers’ trust in tax authorities and by demonstrating power to pursue and punish tax 
evasion. In accordance with the assumptions of the slippery slope framework, findings 
show that the motivation to pay taxes honestly is a function of perceptions of trust and 
power: High trust settings led to voluntary tax compliance, whereas high power of 
authorities evoked enforced tax compliance. In contrast to the findings of Wahl et al. 
(2010) present results indicate that taxpayers tend to evade taxes especially in situations 
with low trust in tax authorities and low power of tax authorities to detect and punish 
tax crimes. This suggests that taxpayers tend to commit tax crimes neither in an 
explicitly antagonistic nor in a synergistic climate, but in an environment with little trust 
in authorities on the one hand and the opportunity to evade on the other. However, the 
chance of getting away with tax evasion is most likely to be high in an environment 
with little governmental power to pursue and punish tax evasion. 
 
As expected, results indicate no direct connection between trust and power aspects and 
general tax morale. Thus, it is suggested that tax morale is a more global, personal 
immanent construct, which, presumably, is too stable for being influenced significantly 
by the experimental manipulation. However, results show a significant country effect: 
Participants from Austria and Hungary show higher extents of tax morale than 
participants from Romania and Russia. With regard to perceived similarity between 
Varosia and participants’ home country, highest similarity was reported in low trust 
conditions, showing that Austrians and Romanians reported highest similarity in the low 
trust and high power scenario. Since Austria and Romania also reported highest 
enforced tax compliance, there might be a reciprocal influence of perceived similarity 
ratings and answering behavior in the experiment. Russian and Hungarian participants 
reported low trust and low power settings as most similar. With regard to Russia, this 
finding matches reported high corruption and the large shadow economy (Schneider, 
Buehn and Montenegro, 2010; Transparency International, 2011), as well as the low 
extent of tax morale found in the Russian sample. 
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In line with previous findings (e.g. Brooks & Doob, 1990; Collins, Milliron & Toy, 
1992) gender of participants had a significant influence on the different forms of tax 
compliance and on tax evasion. Referring to all measured scales, women stated higher 
tax compliance and lower tax evasion rates. Age on the other hand – in contrast to 
several literature findings (e.g. Braithwaite, Smart & Reinhart, 2006; Feinstein, 1991; 
Tittle, 1980) – did not have a significant influence on tax compliance or tax evasion. 
This might be explained by the homogeneity of the sample (Mage = 20.92, SD = 2.62), 
since all participants were students and hence, older groups of participants were not 
covered.  
 
Although results support the slippery slope framework in general, some theoretical 
assumptions could not be met. Tax compliance rates did not reach their maximum by 
the manipulation of trust and power, even though manipulations were very strong and 
presumably more intense than real life perceptions of trust and power. With regard to 
voluntary and enforced tax compliance, the expected effect did not apply to the Austrian 
sample: On the one hand, participants from Austria show highest voluntary tax 
compliance in the condition with little trust and low power of authorities. On the other 
hand, they report higher enforced tax compliance in the low power conditions than 
participants from other countries. These findings suggest that Austrians might feel 
obligations of social responsibility in trustful environments, which affect tax 
compliance by causing feelings of enforcement and reactance. This might explain why 
high extents of trust do not cause voluntary tax compliance and why participants report 
enforced tax compliance in scenarios with low extents of authorities’ power. 
 
This leads to the question of the study’s practical impact. Since the sample consisted 
only of students, it is likely that most participants did not have experience with paying 
taxes actively and, thus, their ratings are not based on personal experience, but rather on 
personal opinions, which are exclusively formed by the experimental manipulation and 
personal attitudes towards taxpaying. Therefore, the present sample cannot claim 
representativeness for the group of taxpayers. Moreover the experiment made use of a 
fictitious country in order to guarantee international comparability, which complicates 
generalizing the findings to actual taxpaying behavior. Since the experiment did not 
take real tax behavior into consideration but focusses on the intention to behave tax 
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compliant, the effect of trust and power on actual tax compliance remains unclear. As 
regards the scales used in the questionnaire, a thoughtful revision is suggested. 
Especially tax morale, which was addressed by only one item, should be approached 
more broadly. Furthermore the measurement of voluntary and enforced tax compliance 
by the motivational constructs commitment and resistance (Braithwaite, 2003) may be 
criticized, since they might only serve as a proxy for the actual underlying motives for 
tax compliant behavior. 
 
The findings of this study suggest that governments should increase tax compliance by 
creating an atmosphere of trust between citizens and tax authorities. In order to achieve 
this goal, transparent and fair procedures (e.g. means of direct political influence) ought 
to be promoted. Thus, tax authorities should not only be visible for taxpayers but also 
highly service-oriented. Due to the significant interaction effect of trust and power, an 
increase in trust in tax authorities would also strengthen authorities’ power and vice 
versa. Especially this finding should be relevant for practical application, since it would 
facilitate not only to enhance voluntary tax compliance, but also to decrease the amount 
of tax evasion. 
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6. Appendix A: Description of fictitious country Varosia  
(Austrian sample, Wahl et al., 2010) 
 
All descriptions began as follows: 
 
Bitte lesen Sie sich folgende Länderbeschreibung durch: 
 
Bei der letzten Volkszählung im April 2009 hatte Varosien 8.404.252 Einwohner und 
die Fläche von Varosien beträgt 83.879 km². Die Arbeitslosenrate ist 
durchschnittlich hoch. 
 
Afterwards relevant information for the manipulation of trust ([low] high) was varied 
between conditions: 
 
Seit der Unabhängigkeit Varosiens ist das Land von [niedriger] großer politischer 
Stabilität und einer [oligarchischen (Herrschaft von Wenigen)] demokratischen 
Regierungsform geprägt. Es werden [selten] regelmäßig Volksbefragungen 
durchgeführt, um die Bürger Varosiens bei der Gesetzgebung mitentscheiden zu 
lassen. 
 
Die Regierung genießt ein [schlechtes] gutes Ansehen bei der Bevölkerung. Aus 
Meinungsumfragen kann geschlossen werden, dass 70% der Bürger mit der 
aktuellen Regierung [nicht] zufrieden sind. 
 
Die Gesetzgebung in Varosien ist [nicht] transparent und die Regierung bietet die 
Möglichkeit, sich bei Rechts- und Steuerfragen an kostenlose Informationsstellen zu 
wenden. Außerdem sind die Behörden in Varosien [wenig] sehr service-orientiert 
und daran interessiert, die Bürger Varosiens zu unterstützen. 
 
Die Budgetausgaben des Staates sind für die Bürger Varosiens [nicht] 
nachvollziehbar. Sie werden regelmäßig durch ein übersichtliches Amtsblatt über 
die Verwendung der Steuergelder informiert. Bei einer Meinungsumfrage im Oktober 
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2010 gaben 78% der Bürger Varosiens an, den Eindruck zu haben, ihre 
Steuergelder würden [nicht] sinnvoll genutzt. 
 
Die makroökonomische Situation in Varosien ist [wenig] stabil und die Regierung 
betreibt eine ausgewogene Budgetpolitik. Dies führt zu einer [hohen] geringen 
Staatsverschuldung. 
 
Außerdem werden sehr [viele] wenige Steuergelder von den Politikern veruntreut. 
Entsprechend einem internationalen Korruptions-Index (CPI) ist Varosien eines der 
Länder mit der [höchsten] geringsten wahrgenommenen Korruptionsrate.  
 
All diese Faktoren führen dazu, dass die Bürger dem Staat Varosien [wenig] sehr 
vertrauen. 
 
Furthermore, the desctiptions were adapted to the manipulation of tax authorities’ 
power ([low] high): 
 
Die Verfolgung von Steuersündern ist [nicht] sehr effektiv. Aufgrund der 
Steuergesetzgebung ist es für den Staat einfach, Steuerkontrollen bei seinen Bürgern 
durchzuführen und somit Steuerhinterzieher zu verfolgen.  
 
Seitens der Regierung wird der Steuerbehörde ein [niedriges] hohes Budget zur 
Verfügung gestellt, um Steuerhinterziehung zu ahnden. Durch die vorhandenen 
Mittel ist es den Steuerbehörden Varosiens möglich, qualifizierte Finanzbeamte 
anzustellen. Zudem werden die Mitarbeiter der Steuerbehörden von Varosiens 
Bürgern als [wenig] sehr präsent wahrgenommen. 
 
Die Steuerprüfwahrscheinlichkeit für Selbständige ist in Varosien sehr [gering] 
hoch, das heißt Selbstständige werden sehr häufig überprüft. Deshalb können auch 
sehr viele der begangenen Steuerdelikte aufgedeckt werden. Zudem sind die Strafen 
für Steuerhinterziehung in Varosien [nicht] sehr streng. Werden Steuerhinterzieher 
aufgedeckt, müssen sie mit empfindlichen Strafen rechnen. Die Steuerbehörde lässt 
bei Steuerhinterziehung keine Milde walten. 
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Aus diesen Gründen, wird der Staat Varosien von seinen Bürgern als [wenig] sehr 
mächtig beurteilt. 
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7. APPENDIX B: Items used in the expieriment  
(Austrian sample) 
 
Intended Tax Compliance (Wahl et. al. 2010) 
 
Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie sind Bürger/in des Landes Varosien. Sie sind selbstständig 
tätig und Ihr Geschäft läuft gut. Ihre Steuererklärung ist wieder fällig und Sie müssen 
Steuern zahlen. 
 
Wie wahrscheinlich würden Sie Ihre Steuern völlig ehrlich abführen? (Intended_TC_1) 
Wie viel Ihres jährlichen Einkommens würden Sie völlig ehrlich versteuern? 
(Intended_TC_2) 
Wie wahrscheinlich würden Sie einen Teil Ihrer Steuern in Varosien einbehalten? 
(Intended_TC_3) 
 
Manipulation check trust (Wahl et. al. 2010) 
 
Die staatlichen Behörden in Varosien handeln fair gegenüber ihren Bürgern. 
(Check_Trust_1) 
In Varosien werden die Interessen einiger Weniger stärker berücksichtigt als die 
Interessen der Gemeinschaft. (Check_Trust_2) 
Die staatlichen Behördenvon Varosien handeln im Interesse ihrer Bürger. 
(Check_Trust_3) 
 
Manipulation check power (Wahl et. al. 2010) 
 
Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Steuerhinterziehung in Varosien entdeckt wird ist hoch. 
(Check_Power_1) 
Es ist einfach in Varosien Steuern zu hinterziehen. (Check_Power_2) 
Die staatlichen Institutionen in Varosien sind sehr effektiv in der Unterdrückung von 
Steuerkriminalität. (Check_Power_3) 
 
Voluntary tax compliance (i.e., “commitment,” Braithwaite, 2003, Kirchler and Wahl, 
2010)  
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Wenn ich meine Steuern vorschriftsmäßig zahle, dann tue ich das,… 
… weil es für mich selbstverständlich ist. (Voluntary_TC_1) 
… um den Staat und andere BürgerInnen zu unterstützen. (Voluntary_TC_2) 
… weil ich gerne zum Wohl Aller beitrage. (Voluntary_TC_3) 
… weil es für mich ganz natürlich ist. (Voluntary_TC_4) 
… weil ich es als meine Pflicht als BürgerIn ansehe. (Voluntary_TC_5) 
 
Enforced tax compliance (i.e., “resistance,” Braithwaite, 2003, Kirchler and Wahl, 
2010) 
 
Wenn ich meine Steuern vorschriftsmäßig zahle, dann tue ich das,… 
…weil viele Steuerprüfungen stattfinden. (Enforced_TC_1) 
… weil die Steuerbehörde häufig kontrolliert. (Enforced_TC_2) 
… weil ich weiß, dass ich kontrolliert werde. (Enforced_TC_3) 
… weil Hinterziehung sehr stark bestraft wird. (Enforced_TC_4) 
… weil ich nicht genau weiß, wie ich Steuern unauffällig hinterziehen kann. 
 (Enforced_TC_5) 
 
Tax Evasion (Kirchler and Wahl, 2010) 
 
Stellen Sie sich bitte weiterhin vor, Sie sind Bürger/in des Landes Varosien. Sie sind 
selbstständig tätig und Ihr Geschäft läuft gut. Ihre Steuererklärung ist wieder fällig 
und Sie müssen Steuern zahlen. 
 
Eine Kundin hat bar bezahlt und keine Rechnung verlangt. Sie könnten diese 
Einnahme in Ihrer Steuererklärung absichtlich weglassen. Wie wahrscheinlich 
würden Sie diese Einnahme weglassen? (Tax_Evasion_1) 
 
Sie haben einen Teil Ihrer Ware privat eingekauft. Sie könnten diese Ware später an 
StammkundInnen weiterverkaufen und den dabei erzielten Gewinn in Ihrer 
Steuererklärung verschweigen. Wie wahrscheinlich würden Sie den erzielten Gewinn 
in Ihrer Steuererklärung verschweigen? (Tax_Evasion_2) 
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Sie könnten Rechnungen von Abendessen mit Ihren FreundInnen absichtlich als 
Geschäftsessen deklarieren. Wie wahrscheinlich würden Sie diese Rechnungen als 
Geschäftsessen deklarieren? (Tax_Evasion_3) 
 
Sie waren im Ausland, um Verwandte zu treffen und eine kurze Unterredung mit 
einer Ihrer LieferantInnen zu führen. Trotzdem könnten Sie die Hotelkosten und das 
Essen, auf das Sie Ihre Verwandten eingeladen haben, als Geschäftsreise bzw. -essen 
deklarieren. Wie wahrscheinlich würden Sie diese Ausgaben als Geschäftsreise bzw.-
essen deklarieren?  (Tax_Evasion_4) 
 
Vor kurzem haben Sie im Unternehmen einer Bekannten an einem Projekt 
mitgearbeitet. Nun könnten Sie diesen steuerpflichtigen Zusatzverdienst in Ihrer 
Steuererklärung verschweigen. Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass Sie diesen 
Zusatzverdienst verschweigen? (Tax_Evasion_5) 
 
Perceived Similarity of Varosia and the Home Country (Wahl et. al. 2010) 
 
Wie ähnlich nehmen Sie das Land Varosien im Vergleich zu Ihrem eigenen Land 
wahr? (Similarity_1) 
 
Wie ähnlich nehmen Sie das Vertrauen in die staatlichen Behörden im Land 
Varosien im Vergleich zu Ihrem eigenen Land wahr? (Similarity_2) 
 
Wie ähnlich nehmen Sie die Macht der staatlichen Behörden im Land Varosien im 
Vergleich zu Ihrem eigenen Land wahr? (Similarity_3) 
 
Tax Morale in General (Alm & Torgler, 2006) 
 
Grundsätzlich, ist Steuerhinterzieung nie gerechtfertigt, immer gerechtfertigt, oder 
manchmal gerechtfertigt? (Tax_Morale) 
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8. Zusammenfassung 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich im Zuge einer internationalen Studie mit der 
Untersuchung des „Slippery Slope Frameworks“ (Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler, Hoelzl & 
Wahl, 2008). Demnach wird Steuerehrlichkeit von zwei Faktoren beeinflusst: einerseits 
dem Vertrauen in den Staat und seine Institutionen sowie andererseits der Macht des 
Staates, insbesondere im Hinblick auf seine Möglichkeiten Steuerkriminalität zu 
verfolgen und zu ahnden. Die Ausübung staatlicher Macht erzeugt erzwungene 
Steuerehrlichkeit, wohingegen ein vertrauensvolles Klima zwischen einem Staat und 
seinen Bürgern zu freiwilliger Steuerehrlichkeit führt. 
 
Insgesamt 1350 Studenten der Wirtschaftswissenschaften aus Österreich, Ungarn, 
Rumänien und Russland nahmen an dem fragebogenbasierten Experiment teil. In 
Anlehnung an die Studie von Wahl, Kastlunger und Kirchler (2010) wurde den 
Teilnehmern in einem Einleitungstext der fiktive Staat Varosien vorgestellt. Dabei 
wurden sie aufgefordert, sich vorzustellen als Bürger Varosiens zu leben, zu arbeiten 
und Steuern zu Zahlen. In der Einleitung wurden die Beschreibungen des Vertrauens 
der Bürger in den Staat sowie der staatlichen Macht so manipuliert, dass vier 
Untersuchungsbedingungen resultierten (große Macht & großes Vertrauen; große Macht 
& geringes Vertrauen, geringe Macht & großes Vertrauen und geringe Macht & 
geringes Vertrauen). Jeder Teilnehmer wurde zufällig einer dieser Bedingungen 
zugewiesen. Der anschließende Fragebogen bestand aus Fragen, die im Zuge 
steuerpsycholgischer Forschung bereits eingesetzt und publiziert wurden. Neben den 
bereits erwähnten Formen der Steuerehrlichkeit (freiwillig vs. erzwungen) wurde die 
Bereitschaft Steuern ehrlich zu zahlen, bzw. zu hinterziehen, die generelle Steuermoral 
und die wahrgenommene Ähnlichkeit Varosiens mit dem jeweiligen Heimatland der 
Teilnehmer erfragt und statistisch mittels mehrfaktorieller Kovarianzanalyse 
ausgewertet. 
 
Die länderübergreifenden Ergebnisse bestätigen die Annahmen des „Slippery Slope 
Frameworks“, wonach staatliche Machtausübung zu erzwungener Steuerehrlichkeit und 
wechselseitiges Vertrauen zu freiwilliger Steuerehrlichkeit führt. Dabei beeinflussen 
sich die beiden Faktoren gegenseitig, sodass eine Zunahme des Vertrauens auch eine 
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höhere wahrgenommene Macht des Staates nach sich zieht und umgekehrt. Eine 
Kombination aus großer wahrgenommener Macht des Staates und großem Vertrauen in 
die staatlichen Institutionen führte zu besonders großer Bereitschaft, sich steuerehrlich 
zu verhalten. 
Darüber hinaus deuten die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass Steuerhinterziehung besonders 
dann stattfindet, wenn einerseits der Staat nicht über adäquate Mittel verfügt um 
Steuerkriminalität zu verfolgen und andererseits die Bürger wenig Vertrauen in die 
staatlichen Institutionen haben. Unabhängig von den Faktoren Macht und Vertrauen 
zeigte sich länderübergreifend eine hohe Steuermoral.  
 
Insgesamt liefern die Ergebnisse einen empirischen Nachweis für die internationale 
Gültigkeit der Annahmen des „Slippery Slope Frameworks“. 
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